Radicalist discourse: a study of the

stances of Nigeria's Boko Haram and

Somalia's Al Shabaab on Twitter by Chiluwa, Innocent
This article was downloaded by: [Innocent Chiluwa]
On: 10 June 2015, At: 04:04
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Click for updates
Journal of Multicultural Discourses
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmmd20
Radicalist discourse: a study of the
stances of Nigeria's Boko Haram and
Somalia's Al Shabaab on Twitter
Innocent Chiluwaa
a Department of Languages, Covenant University
Published online: 05 Jun 2015.
To cite this article: Innocent Chiluwa (2015): Radicalist discourse: a study of the stances of
Nigeria's Boko Haram and Somalia's Al Shabaab on Twitter, Journal of Multicultural Discourses, DOI:
10.1080/17447143.2015.1041964
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2015.1041964
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
nn
oc
en
t C
hil
uw
a] 
at 
04
:04
 10
 Ju
ne
 20
15
 
Radicalist discourse: a study of the stances of Nigeria’s Boko Haram
and Somalia’s Al Shabaab on Twitter
Innocent Chiluwa*
Department of Languages, Covenant University
(Received 21 March 2015; accepted 10 April 2015)
This study examines the features of stance in tweets downloaded from the English
Twitter accounts of Boko Haram and Al Shabaab, referred to as ‘radicalist discourse’.
Stance, referred to as ‘positioning’ or point of views of tweeters, is defined in terms of
features such as hedges, boosters, attitude markers, self-mention and threats. These
express commitment, attitude and judgement of writers on the issues being discussed.
Applying mostly qualitative analysis, the study shows that self-mention and attitude
markers are the most prevalent features of stance in radicalist discourse. Thus, stance
is used to express triumph, satisfaction, anger and hate by the radical groups under
study. The various expressions of attitude and self-mention in the data portray positive
construction of in-group and negative evaluation of others (i.e. governments and
institutions) referred to as infidels and apostates.
Keywords: radicalist discourse; stance; Boko Haram; Al Shabaab; tweets; Twitter
1. Introduction
Stance refers to the ways writers present themselves and convey their judgements,
opinions and commitments in their writings. Thus, authors express ‘a textual voice or
community recognized personality …’ as well as ‘stamp their personal authority onto
their arguments or step back and disguise their involvement’ (Hyland 2005, 175). The
study of stance-taking in discourse takes a cue from the understanding that a speaker’s or
writer’s internal thoughts, opinions and attitudes about a topic being conveyed can be
expressed implicitly or explicitly through certain words or grammatical forms the writer
chooses (Biber 2006). Hence, Biber and Finegan (1989, 124) define stance as ‘the lexical
and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgements, or commitment concerning
the propositional content of a message’.
Stance in computer-mediated discourse (CMD), which is of particular interest to the
current study, not only manifests in terms of vocabulary (i.e. lexical stance) and grammar
(i.e. grammatical stance) but also paralinguistically (see Biber et al. 1999). Paralinguistic
devices such as pitch, degree of loudness, duration of sound in verbal or synchronous
online communications are often depicted in CMD through signs and some typographical
conventions (Park 2007). Affect (or emotion), for example, is often depicted by emoticons
showing either sadness or joy (see Gales 2010, 58–59). The current study however
focuses on lexical and grammatical stances since online discourse produced by radical
groups does not reflect non-linguistic devices probably because the writers’ stances are
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expressed more through the written word than paralinguistic signs. Unfortunately there
was none at all in the data for this study.
Some studies on religious violence, particularly the Boko Haram insurgency in
Nigeria, have examined its historical and political implications (See Loimeier 2012;
Okemi 2013; Burchard 2014). However, stance-taking in discourse, especially of radical
and terrorist groups in Africa in the context of computer-mediated communication (CMC)
and their broader political implications, is almost non-existent. Hence, certain questions
about online behaviours of radicalist (or terrorist) groups in Nigeria, Mali, Somalia or
Sudan have not really been answered. For example, how have these groups utilized the
Internet or social media to spread their ideologies in an attempt to solicit for supports of
or radicalize other Internet users? What stance do they take and how do they position
themselves in CMD that they produce given the overwhelming influence of information
technology in modern (political) communication?
This study shows that online discourses associated with rebel groups and radical
movements not only reflect total commitment to some particular positions and viewpoints
in texts, but also express emotional commitment to those viewpoints (Chiluwa, in press).
This study further attempts to provide answers to the following questions: (1) How do
radicalist groups in Nigeria and Mali express their viewpoints and emotional commitment
through stance markers (e.g. boosters and hedges)? (2) How do they express ideology
through attitude markers, self-mention and threats? The three aspects of stance identified
by Hyland (2005) namely evidentiality, affect and presence expressed as hedges,
boosters, attitude markers and self-mention (and I add threats) are applied in the analysis.
2. Social media in political communication
Social media have provided a medium for individuals and groups to make their voices
heard. Although they started off as a digital platform for networking among friends,
social media have since turned into a dynamic resource for sociopolitical and civil
engagements. Popular responses through digital social networks have been the radical
rejection of erstwhile oppressive regimes and the demand for sociopolitical change.
Radical and rebel groups also utilize the opportunities and affordances provided by digital
communication resources to advance their positions and activities. Studies on the use of
social media for civil and political purposes have established that Twitter in particular is
the fastest and most critical campaign tool for reaching and mobilizing people; for
gathering data and responding to public reactions (Vergeer and Hermans 2013; Parker
2012). Individuals and social groups who are concerned about social developments and
events in their various countries have also mobilized protests using social media (web
2.0, i.e. social networking sites, blogs, wikis, etc.). In the Tunisian Revolution for
example, social media acted as an important resource for popular mobilization against the
government by allowing digital media practitioners to break the national media restriction
to make information available for the mainstream media. Social media also provided the
basis for intergroup collaboration that facilitated mass participation; thus overcame
the collective action problem through reporting the magnitude of events that raised the
perception of success for the protesters (Breuer et al. 2012, 1). Direct reporting of events
with supporting photographs added ‘emotional mobilization’ through ‘depicting the worst
atrocities associated with the government’s response’ to the protests (2).
Most of the individual and group communications/protests that take place on digital
media platforms consist of ‘positioning’ of individual or group arguments, or point of
view of speakers and writers. As highlighted above, this point of view generally
2 I. Chiluwa
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expresses the writer’s attitude, commitment and opinion towards the proposition or the
subject matter in question. This positioning or point of view is referred to as stance
(Hyland 2005).
Political and cultural discourses often highlight group relations, conflicts and
resistances and involve debates that are often publicized by the mass media and the
Internet. And generally, stances reflect the kind of social and cultural positions,
assumptions and identities people take in relations to other members of the society.
Ideologies expressed through stance-taking generally recognize the main ideological and
cultural assumptions of certain groups as well as other groups, and when people feel that
their identities, cultures and social rights are infringed upon, they resist and conflict
results. This nature of ideologies characterizes political groups, social movements or
rebel/terrorist groups (van Dijk 2005). Hence, having proper understanding of people’s
cultural and social uniqueness as expressed in the kind of discourses they produce, as
well as proper respect for such cultural and ideological positions and stances, will achieve
social harmony. Like Shi-xu (in press) rightly observes, being conscious of people’s
cultural differences and adopting critically minded approaches to communication towards
them will foster cultural coexistence, harmony and prosperity. In the study of the stances
of the rebel/terrorist groups on Twitter, which highlights their positions (in terms of why
they do what do they; what cultural assumptions they espouse and what they wish to be
known for), this study recognizes that human discourses are culturally differentiated and
competitive in terms of groups’ worldviews, identities, interests, values or representations
(see Shi-xu 2009); therefore, having the right understanding of and proper attitude
towards the rebels groups in question, in terms of their uniqueness; and they in turn,
having respect to the society’s expectations of them, will likely foster peace and social
harmony.
3. Boko Haram
Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by a Muslim cleric, known as Mohammed Yusuf in
Maiduguri, Northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram, (in Hausa) stands for ‘western education is
sacrilegious’, and the group claims to reject everything Western, including education and
social lifestyle, and has carried out attacks on schools, beer halls and pubs. The radical
Islamic group insists on a strict adoption of Sharia in all parts of Nigeria particularly the
north eastern part of Nigeria, and have attacked some northern governors accused of
compromising Islamic standards. ‘Sharia’ refers to the moral code and religious law of a
prophetic religion (e.g. Islam); Sharia law is a major source of legislation in various Muslim
countries (see Bearman et al. 2014). In June 2009 for instance, Boko Haram, embarked on
an armed uprising, which according to them was aimed at fighting corruption and to
Islamize the entire northern states. The uprising was confronted by the Nigerian military,
resulting in the death of over 700 sect members. For the group, this has meant a greater
reason to pursue its objectives (see Chiluwa and Adegoke 2013).
Boko Haram, which has since formally confirmed its link with al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb and the Somalia-based Al Shabaab, operates also in Mali and probably
Somalia (Blair 2012; Olagunju 2012), and members call themselves the ‘Nigerian
Taliban’. The group is also said to have split into three factions operating in Cameroon,
Chad and Niger with some possible links to some terrorist groups in North Africa (Onuah
and Eboh 2011). Several bombings at beer pubs, banks and police stations for which
Boko Haram claimed responsibility have resulted in several deaths. On 26 August 2011
for instance, the radicals bombed the United Nations Headquarters at Abuja killing over
Journal of Multicultural Discourses 3
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20 people and wounded 116 others. A bomb attack on St. Theresa’s Catholic Church in
Madalla (a town in Niger state) on the 25 December 2011 resulted in the death of over 35
worshippers. Since, its formation, the group is said to be responsible for the death of over
3000 people (Christians and Muslims alike) in northern Nigeria. Due to frequent series of
violent attacks that destroyed government buildings and killing of officials and civilians
in the northern states, the Nigeria Government in May 2013 declared a state of emergency
in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states and ordered more military troops to be deployed in
the affected states (see BBC News, May 15, 2013). This state of emergency, however,
does not seem to have deterred the militants. On 8 July 2013, Boko Haram attacked a
boarding school at Mamudo in Yobe state, killing over 30 students and a teacher when
their dormitory was doused in fuel and set on fire. Some who tried to escape were shot
dead (Amnesty International, July 8, 2013). In a similar attack (29 September 2013), the
sect in spite of the state of emergency, again killed over 40 students at a College of
Agriculture at Gubja in Yobe state. On the 25 February 2014, the group attacked a
Federal Government Secondary School at Buni Yadi in Yobe state and murdered 59
students while they slept in their dormitories (Premium Times, February 26, 2014). On 14
April 2014, Boko Haram again bombed a bus station at Nyanya in the Nigerian federal
capital (Abuja) killing 75 people and injuring over 200. The following day, the Islamist
militants kidnapped 276 girls at a government school in Chibok (Borno state) and burnt
down the school; 43 of the girls escaped, and as at the time of this research, over 200 girls
were still missing. Several attacks and sacking of whole villages in the northeast have
continued up till the early parts of 2015. Some villages have even been taken over
by them.
4. Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab which in Arabic means ‘the youth,’ was founded in 2006 as a radical arm of
the Union of Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and is estimated to control over 7000 fighters
(see Calamur 2013). Their leader Aden Hashi Ayro was killed in a US air strike in May
2008 and was replaced by Ahmed Abdi Godane (or Abu Zubayr) as their top commander
(Ungerleider 2013). Al Shabaab operates from the Southern and Central Somalia with a
mission to create a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia. It enforces a harsh
interpretation of the Sharia and like the Boko Haram, prohibits Western lifestyle and
entertainment. Hence, it condemns Western education, music, movies, haircut, etc., and
had kidnapped and conscripted schoolchildren to fight in battles. They attack non-
Muslims, including Christians and are a major threat to humanitarian and other
international workers. For instance, the group was said to be responsible for the
assassination of Somali peace activists, international aid workers, journalists and
numerous civil society personnel, and was blamed for blocking the delivery of aid
from some Western relief agencies during the 2011 famine that killed thousands of
Somalis (see Masters 2013).
Members of Al Shabaab are said to be drawn from different clans and regional sub-
clans and their militant groups. They also exert influences and recruit radicalized youths
from elsewhere in the African sub-regions. Some radicalized American youths from the
Somali-American Diaspora are also said to have been recruited. According to Gentleman
(2011), educated Westerners work for Al Shabaab and several Somali-Americans have
killed themselves as suicide bombers. Some non-Somali Westerners (including a man
from Alabama) is also said to serve as battlefield commanders.
4 I. Chiluwa
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As an affiliate of Al-Qaeda, Al Shabaab has resisted and fought against the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and its allies, including the African
Union Mission in Somalia peacekeepers, and non-governmental aid organizations. The
group is said to be more interested in their nationalistic battle against the TFG and hopes
to regain control of Southern and Central regions of Somalia, which it had attacked and
took over in 2006 but was overthrown by the Somali Government with the help of
Ethiopian forces. The in-fighting and military pressure from the Somali Government and
its allies has continued to liberate key towns from Al Shabaab. However, the group had
continued to threaten neighbouring African countries and Western interests in Africa. Al
Shabaab had claimed responsibility for several bombing attacks including suicide
bombings in Mogadishu and in central and northern Somalia. The attacks had targeted
Somali Government officials and their allies. They have also carried out some five
coordinated suicide car bombings in October 2008 that simultaneously hit targets in two
cities in northern Somalia killing about 26 people and injuring 29 others. Al Shabaab also
claimed responsibility for the twin suicide bombings in Kampala (Uganda) on 11 July
2010 that killed over 70 people who gathered to watch the world cup. The USA
designated this group as foreign terrorist organization and their leader as a global terrorist
in 2008 (see http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650).
5. Tweets in radicalist discourse
I shall define ‘radicalist discourse’ broadly as language use by radical movements and
rebel groups, either written or spoken. This genre of discourse shares similar features with
protest discourse such as language use in a direct rejection of perceived victimization,
denial of rights, marginalization or human rights violations by national or regional
governments. Literature on discourse by radical/terrorist groups is not common. Gales
(2010) describes the ideology of ‘threatening communication’, which does not specify
particular threats by rebel groups: anyone can issue a threat, and threats are only one
feature of radicalist discourse.
Radicalist discourse is associated with sociopolitical activism as well as calls for
actions in form of riots and protests. Such calls generally involve the expression of radical
ideas and opinions through strong language that oppose/resist existing sociopolitical
structures. Radical/terrorist groups like the Boko Haram of Nigeria and the Somalia’s Al
Shabaab, for example, have used Twitter to enunciate not only their ideological
orientations but also to attack national governments, as well as enhance their own
reputation and prestige. Unlike the discourse of resistance (Chiluwa 2012b) in organized
rebellions like those being witnessed in the Arab spring or occupy movements, language
use by radical groups combines highly organized resistance with threats and verbal war.
Ungerleider (2013), calls this verbal war ‘hate speech’. Al Shabaab’s Twitter accounts
have been closed down at different times for using the Twitter platform to spread
‘linguistic violence’ (Gay 1999).
Discourse of radicalism is highly ideological and generally characterized by the
assertion of group identity; radical demands for social justice; rejection of religious
tolerance and demand for the restoration of individual or group rights/privileges that are
assumed to have been denied by governments or institutions. The structure of ideological
discourse by rebel groups includes the enunciation of ‘we’ in-group in the establishment
of religious or cultural identity and the definition of membership; they also identify and
define their friends and enemies; establish their goals and group ideology as the basis for
their activities (see van Dijk 2005). In most cases radicalized members of this group
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denounce the ‘other’ often referred to as ‘infidels’ or ‘apostates’. Boko Haram and Al
Shabaab have one thing in common, i.e., the fact that both groups espouse Islamic
religious ideology and claim to defend Islam from corruption by Western enemies. They
also advocate strict adherence to Sharia laws and apply violence to enforce Jihadism;
thus, reject Western and ‘un-Islamic’ influences. But they have also been criticized by
other Muslims for their extreme violent approach in the pursuit of Jihad. In some cases,
liberal Muslims have been attacked and killed by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, and
some liberal Muslim clerics have also been persecuted by Al Shabaab.
Twitter has also been used not only to champion revolutionary approaches through
activism but also to recruit as well as radicalize protesters and militants (see Gonzalez-
Bailon et al. 2012). Gonzalez-Bailon (2011) had earlier explained that when activists
make calls to action from different online sources (including Twitter), their effects were
amplified, resulting in ‘recruitment bursts’, which is responsible for the recruitment of
many users who were responding to the collective behaviour of others (1). Because the
messages of tweets are usually brief, users can send several tweets and respond to others
within a very short time. ‘Tweeters’ report and respond to ongoing events and contribute
to discussions. Except in some rare cases (i.e. cases of spreading of verbal attacks by
rebel groups), ‘tweeting’ is usually unrestricted. And with the added advantage of
‘retweeting’ (an equivalent of email forwarding where users post messages originally
posted to others) (see Boyd et al. 2010), Twitter enables users to coordinate events and
disseminate news and information on some specific trendy topics.
As noted above, the use of Twitter by Islamist militant groups (e.g. Al Shabaab and
Boko Haram) has often been characterized by linguistic violence or ‘twitter terrorism’
(Gentleman 2011) against institutions and governments accused of undermining their
rights to exist. Boko Haram, for example, has used Twitter to project their ideological
stance and accuse northern Nigerian governors of compromising Islamic teachings. They
have also applied their tweets to assert their identity and goals as well as mobilize
supporters (see Chiluwa and Adegoke 2013). According to Gentleman (2011), terrorist
organizations utilize the Internet to recruit individuals, fundraise and distribute propa-
ganda more efficiently than they had done in time past. Some radicalize young people
(e.g. Americans) and other recruits from elsewhere have gone ahead to become social
media ‘stars’ and use the English language Twitter feeds to serve as a link between their
organizations and the outside world. Thus, their forms of activism have involved the use
of Twitter to manage their public diplomacy and taunt regional enemies (Gentleman
2011). The sample below is an example of tweets by Al Shabaab to the Kenyan army:
Your inexperienced boys flee from confrontation & flinck in the face of death. (@HSMPress)
The real identity and locations of the tweeters are uncertain. For Boko Haram, it is
possible that the tweeters are radicalized Muslim youths in northern Nigeria with
evidence that some of the tweets end with Hausa slogans (users of this type of slogans are
likely Muslims; see an example below). The tweets may also have been written by some
southern youths who support Boko Haram’s mission and tactics.
@_BokoHaram @_Boko_Haram
As drops of water we are firing Arewa and infidel Nigeria.
Yaro dan is cene.
6 I. Chiluwa
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Since the tweets are written in English, the audience is not necessarily Muslims or Hausa
speaking northerners/Fulanis but all Africans, and may also have aimed at reaching
outsiders, especially radicalized Muslims from other countries in Europe and the USA.
The tweets have the potential to radicalize Muslims from other parts of the Africa where
they are less likely to speak Hausa (See Chiluwa and Ajiboye 2014).
6. Linguistic features of tweets
In terms of style and structure, CMD combines features of spoken and written language
(e.g. English). Honeycutt and Herring (2009), for instance, identify the conversational
patterns of language use in Twitter that is characteristic of person to person exchanges.
And tweets have also been described as an ‘electronic word of mouth’, due to their often
informal manifestations (Jansen et al. 2009). In many instances, Internet language
(including Twitter) departs from grammatical norms that are associated with Standard
(English) writing. According to Crystal (2011), lexical and grammatical forms of online
communication are characteristic of short forms, sentence fragments and lengthy
coordinated sentences. It is also not uncommon to find multiple instances of subordina-
tion, and elaborately balanced syntactic patterns and items of vocabulary that are never
spoken. Interestingly, there is also evidence of ‘nonsense vocabulary’, obscenity and
slang in online writing (including Twitter; 18). Crystal further observes that grammatical
complexity also exists in tweets, which is reflective to higher levels of discourse
organization (47). This means that online communication combines evidence of standard
and non-standard writings.
Since Twitter is constrained by space, tweeters are forced to restrict their writings to
the available space (not more than 140 characters); this often results in sentence
fragments or minor sentences. But in most cases, points of view of writers (like radical
groups) are usually not in any way endangered, except in cases of complete incoherence
arising from typing errors. This is consistent with the original purpose and use of social
media as a tool for networking among young people, who are easily amenable to
linguistic creativity and play. However, tweets that are posted on the Twitter accounts of
radical/rebel groups lack the playful nature of digital communication; thus, do not contain
any form of linguistic creativity; short forms are generally rare or completely absent.
Thus, Twitter language of Boko Haram and Al Shabaab falls within the generic category
described by Hu et al. (2013) as ‘surprisingly formal’ with evidence of the use of
grammatical intensifiers and personal pronouns and could well be described as
‘conservative and less informal than SMS and online chat’ (1).
But Twitter constrains its users to some contextual features such as linguistic/
typographic markers like the hashtag (#) or @ sign (e.g. @boko haram). The latter brings
other tweeters into a conversation, republishing other tweets and flagging topics that may
be adopted by multiple users (Zappavigna 2011). Prefixing an item with a hashtag
(i.e. #) indicates that some posts have been grouped under a semantic topic such as
#government or #bokophilosophy. This is to enable others to follow conversations that
centre on a particular topic.
Zappavigna (2011) observes that tweets perform both ideational and interpersonal
functions following the systemic functional theory. Within the context of interpersonal
meaning is ‘evaluation’, where ‘language is used to build power and solidarity by
adopting stances and referring to other texts’ (794). To analyse evaluative meaning draws
on a theory of appraisal (Martin and White 2005), which views linguistic patterning in a
text as a meaning potential for emotional language. This emotional language is expressed
Journal of Multicultural Discourses 7
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
nn
oc
en
t C
hil
uw
a] 
at 
04
:04
 10
 Ju
ne
 20
15
 
in attitude (making evaluations), engagement (bringing other voices into the text and
graduation (scaling up or down evaluation; Zappavigna 2011). The analysis of stance in
the present study relies mainly on the evaluative character of stance to reflect attitude and
judgement.
7. Stance in discourse
Several scholars and authors adopt different terminologies for stance and focus on
different aspects of positioning in various genres of discourse. For instance, Biber’s and
Finnegan’s (1989) study was based on recorded written and spoken texts, while Ochs
(1990) focused on the analysis of conversational interactions. Hyland (2005) was
concerned with academic discourse of published research articles. These are among
several other approaches to stance studies applied to different genres of language use.
As pointed out in the Introduction, the present study adopts Hyland’s (2005) approach
to the study of stance. Here, stance is defined as ‘positioning’ or ‘adopting a point of view
in relation to both the issues discussed in the text and to others who hold points of view
on those issues’. ‘In claiming the right to be heard and their work taken seriously …
stance takers express a textual “voice” or community recognized personality …’ (175).
And this can be seen as an attitudinal dimension and includes features which refer to the
ways writers present themselves and convey their judgements, opinions and
commitments.
According to Hyland, stance consists of evidentiality, affect and presence, which are
expressed in a text as hedges, boosters, attitude markers and self-mention. Evidentiality is
the author’s position or his expressed commitment to his topic and the credibility of his/
her claims, as well as his possible impact on the reader; affect reflects the writer’s
communication of attitude and feeling in his proposition and presence is how the writer
chooses to project himself/herself (Hyland 2005, 178). ‘Hedges’ in discourse is a point
where the writer withholds commitment to a proposition, leaving the information he/she
presents as an opinion rather than a fact. This implies that a statement is based on
plausible reasoning rather than certain knowledge (Hyland 2005). Hedges manifests in
grammar as adverbs (e.g. probably, possibly, perhaps, may be, etc.), modals (may, might),
prepositional phrases (kind of, sort of), etc.
Unlike hedges, boosters such as certainly, clearly, obviously, surely, without/no doubt,
etc. are used to express the writer’s certainty of a proposition (or findings) and also to
mark the level of commitment and involvement with the topic and solidarity with his/her
audience. Boosters also function to stress shared information, group membership and
engagement with readers (Hyland 1999, 2005).
Attitude markers express the writer’s affect (i.e. emotions and feelings) towards a
topic or proposition. Attitude markers may express surprise, importance, frustration,
agreement, etc. rather than commitment (Hyland 2005). ‘Self-mention’ is the use of
personal pronoun ‘I’ or ‘we’ (and ‘us’), and the possessive adjective ‘our’ to indicate
proposition, affect and interpersonal information (Hyland 2001, 2005). This is not
common in scientific writings (Hyland 2005) but the presence or absence of a definite
reference indicates the type of authorial identity the writer wishes to adopt in his/her
work. Thus, Hyland (2005) version of stance is viewed as the most appropriate in the
analysis of stance in radicalist online discourse as it provides the right framework for
examining points of view, and emotional commitment of the writers.
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8. Methodology
Data for this study comprise mainly tweets downloaded from the Boko Haram English
Language Twitter profile and that of Al Shabaab between 2012 and 2014. As at the time
of this research, there were only 148 tweets (of 3090 words) and retweets (with 565
followers and 8 following) on the Boko Haram account (i.e. @Boko Haram) posted
between 2011 and 2012. Surprisingly, the Boko Haram Twitter account appears dormant
since 2012. The reasons for this inactivity in the account are not immediately known.
Possible reasons could be that those who operated the account suddenly withdrew their
supports for the group; second, Boko Haram deliberately abandoned their English
language account for whatever reason. When the sect first came on Twitter, they operated
two separate accounts namely: @Boko Haram (republic of Arewa) and @Boko Haram
(Chadian border). The latter account was shut down not long afterwards, probably for
using it to spread linguistic violence. The former account (i.e. @Boko Haram, republic of
Arewa) was left, where I obtained the data for this study. Al Shabaab’s English language
account was closed down by Twitter shortly after the attack on Nairobi Westgate
Shopping Mall for breaking Twitter’s terms of service, (i.e. Twitter prohibits the use of
Twitter for making threats of violence; see AP 24 September 2013). Al Shabaab had live-
tweeted the Mall attack and posted tweets that defended the mass killings and threatened
more bloodshed (see Ortiz 2013). An example below is a live tweet by Al Shabaab during
the Westgate attack:
SHAB7. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
The Mujahideen entered #Westgate Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall,
fighting the #Kenyan Kuffar inside their own turf
Al Shabaab Twitter feed (i.e. @HSMPress) carries a self-identify description (i.e.
‘Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahideen is an Islamic movement that governs South &
Central Somalia and part of the global struggle towards the revival of Islamic Khilaafa’).
The Boko Haram account on the other hand carries a slogan: ‘I hate School’, which
appears as a logo. It also carries an explanation such as ‘to hate is human, to bomb is
divine’. ‘We hate western inventions including Twitter: however, we feel the necessity to
use it to reach out to our fans’. The first tweet by Al Shabaab is in the name of God with
the following words: ‘In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful’.
The data rely on tweets that were posted by Al Shabaab (already about 20 tweets that
attracted 3016 followers) before the Twitter account was shut down. A few other tweets
posted from 2011 are included totally 34 tweets (of 800 words). Altogether this study
examines 182 tweets, which I think is enough for a study of groups that do less talk and
more (violent) actions. Although this number is very small, being what was available at
the time of research, they give sufficient insight to the discursive character of radicalist
discourse in the social media. The analysis is mainly qualitative involving textual/
discourse analysis of the tweet samples showing the functions of the stance markers being
studied. A small amount of quantitative analysis is also adopted in order to account for
the frequencies of the stance markers in the data.
9. Analysis and discussion
Analysis examines the expression of stance following the Hyland’s model discussed
above, where stance is viewed in terms of evidentiality, affect and presence manifesting
as hedges, boosters, attitude markers and self-mention. First, evidentiality or point of
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view is discussed independently in order to fully examine the position of the radicalist
groups under study.
9.1. Evidentiality in radicalist discourse
In projecting their positions in texts, writers (including tweeters) are usually aware that
their readers also have points of view on the issues they discuss. Hence their goal is to
persuade and possibly convince their readers to adopt their own point of view. Every
written discourse therefore anticipates a response from the reader as the discourse itself
belongs to a community whose members already hold certain forms of argument or
position on the issues being discussed (Hyland 2005). ‘Evidentiality’ in the context of
this study stands for tweet authors’ positions, which explain the reasons why the radical
groups under study have carried out series of attacks in Nigeria and Somalia, and how
they have engaged the readers in their argument, while negotiating solidarity.
Radicalist discourse is characterized by features that suggest group reaction to
perceived injustice. Some radical groups lay claim to their right to resistance against
institutional victimization, persecution by national/regional governments, ethnic/religious
marginalization or racial discrimination (see Chiluwa 2011). The overall position of the
Islamic tweeters in the radicalist discourse of tweets has been the creation of the Islamic
state of Northern Nigeria strictly governed by the Sharia law (for the Boko Haram), and
the control of Southern and Central regions of Somalia as a Sovereign Islamic state by the
Al Shabaab. Tweets in this context are mainly used as propaganda against government
actions, or to mobilize support and followership. Boko Haram claims responsibility to
protect Islam through violence from compromise and total collapse in northern Nigeria,
where some Muslim governors (according to them) have compromised Muslim standards
and adopted Western lifestyle. The entire northern Nigeria is viewed as polluted by
Western influence and the violation of Sharia laws. Hence, the sect members seek not
only to secure a separate government in the north but also claim to liberate the people and
defend sociocultural and moral ideals (Chiluwa and Ajiboye 2014). This type of
argument in a predominant Muslim north and in a fairly populated Muslim south is
most likely to attract support, even among the liberal Muslims who have criticized the
sect’s violent method of achieving Jihad in northern Nigeria. However, Boko Haram is
not alone in their agitation for a separate state in Nigeria: the Biafra campaign groups
have consistently made similar demands for an independent state of the Igbos (see
Chiluwa 2012b). Thus, Boko Haram is not only making a sentimental appeal but also
appeals to the shared knowledge between them and the reader, as a form of engaging the
reader’s positioning in constructing similar line of reasoning since they share same
sociopolitical and cultural context.
It is therefore clear that the Radicalist groups under study seek both political and
religious independence from their national and regional governments. They have also made
this position clear in their tweets. Below is an example from Al Shabaab Twitter account:
SHAB2. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
The attack at Westgate Mall is just a very tiny fraction of what Muslims in Somalia
experience at the hands of Kenyan invaders.
SHAB5.HSMPRESS @HSMPRESS1
The Mujahideen strive to liberate Muslim lands & lift the oppression from Muslims who are
forced to live under the heel of Kafir Invasion.
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The point of view expressed in the above tweets is simply that the writers view their
activities as a revenge mission for some perceived injustice meted to Somali Muslims by
the Kenyan authorities. Attacks on the Westgate mall were viewed as an action to
‘liberate’ Muslims from the assumed oppression. Thus, Al Shabaab take the position of
liberators. But as serious as the above allegations may sound, there are no obvious
documented proofs that Muslims have been oppressed by the Somali governments (a far
as I know). It is, however, possible that the Somali Government’s battle with Al Shabaab
may have resulted in the death of civilians. In which case, any group in Somalia that
represents Islamic interests has the right to seek legal action against the government if
there is indeed evidence of oppression against Muslims in Somalia, rather than direct
attacks on civilians at a shopping mall.
Nigeria’s Boko Haram have also made similar mission statements in the past.
However, in the examples from the data below, the Islamic fundamentalists appear to be
committed to ‘liberating’ not only the northern states but also the entire country from the
corrupt leadership of the ‘infidel government of Nigeria’. This argument is expressed in
the examples below. (It is important to mention here that the tweets being analysed are
those written by Boko Haram and not their supporters. Those written by their supporters
appear in the data as retweets.)
BOK2. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
We love Nigerians, it’s only the nigerian polis, nigerian army, drunkards, prostitutes,
politicians, usurers, teachers, touts we can’t stand.
BOK3. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
2 fools: Obasanjo and Babangida (plus one infidel dunce in aso rock) taking 150 million
people for fools. Join Arewa Boko republic.
BOK4. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
We have left Nigeria. We are in Boko Republic of Arewa. The infidel nig. govt and kafiri
army should leave us.
In expressing stance as positioning and point of view, Boko Haram in the above tweets
also claim to be liberators of Nigerians, again assuming the position of ‘lovers of
Nigeria’. By implication, their activities are not to be viewed as antisocial, rather as
‘freedom fighting’. In BOK4 above, they take the position of non-Nigerians, who are
fighting for the creation of the so-called ‘Republic of Arewa’.
Apart from building on some shared background knowledge, thus constructing
solidarity with the reader, tweeters attempt to convince their readers by making calls to
them to adopt a particular viewpoint. In BOK3 above, the tweet calls on the reader to
‘join Arewa Boko republic’. This form of engagement involves rhetorically pulling the
reader to ‘critical points, predicting possible objections, and guiding them to particular
interpretations’ of the issues at hand (Hyland 2005, 182). For example, Nigerians are
called upon to see Boko Haram as friends rather than enemies.
The Boko Haram tweeters have actually taken the advantage of the common
knowledge of the history of Nigeria’s underdevelopment usually attributed to government
corruption, ineptitude and incompetence. Already, several voices in the Nigerian society
are demanding for a social revolution, similar to those currently being witnessed in North
Africa (Chiluwa 2012a). Hence, the Boko Haram tweeters adopt this persuasive
engagement of the reader in assigning to the Nigerian reading public a role (who are
already tired of corruption in Nigeria) in creating the argument and assuming their
solidarity.
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Having established the conventional position and textual voice of Boko Haram and Al
Shabaab on Twitter in their struggle to establish dominant Islamic enclaves in their
separate Africa sub-regions, I now examine how they express their commitment, attitude,
emotion or feelings through hedges, boosters, attitude markers, self-mention and threats
in the discourse of sociopolitical and religious freedom.
9.2. Hedges
According to Hyland (1998), hedges (e.g. probably, possibly, etc.) enable the writer to
involve the reader as participant in the argument, conveying modesty or respect for the
view of others. So hedging does not make specific claims in terms of reality or factuality.
Interestingly, radicalist discourse makes claims most of the time. In the entire data of the
Al Shabaab tweets, only four instances of grammatical hedging are evident, where hedges
are used to express mere disbelief in a perpetual closure of the Al Shabaab Twitter
account and to give an unconfirmed number of deaths the group claimed responsibility
for. Here are the examples:
SHAB14. HSMPRESS @HSMPRESS1
Freedom of speech is but a meaningless rhetoric. So long @HSMPress! You might be gone,
but your legacy lives on.
SHAB15. HSMPRESS @HSMPRESS1
And it is arguable that the closure of the account is a clear indication of the effectiveness of
the message emanating from the ‘other side’.
SHAB16. HSMPRESS @HSMPRESS1
The Mujahideen have last night carried out a large offensive against the #Ethiopian invaders
in Bidoa, killing at least 24 of the invaders.
Hedges in the above samples are certainly not intended to express deference or modesty
to the opinion of readers. This is not surprising considering the general nature of radicalist
discourse. In many cases, radicalist discourse has been characterized by claim-making
(sometimes unconfirmed claims), assertive statements and accusations, all of which do
not require the use of hedges. This explains why there are so few occurrences of hedges
in the data. In SHAB14 above, ‘you might be gone’ is rather used in defence of the
existence of their Twitter account (i.e. @HSMPress) that was closed down for violating
Twitter’s operational guidelines. Al Shabaab views this closure as an infringement on
their freedom speech. Here, hedging is used as rhetorical strategy to ‘mourn’ the demise
of @HSMPress and to indirectly maintain that it has not really died. This is confirmed by
the fact that the account was reopened after a short while before the Westgate attack. The
closure following the Westgate attack was about the fifth time in two year and the second
time in 2013 (see Associated Press, 23 September 2013). Even after the English language
account was suspended, the Arabic language accounts continued to operate and were used
to denounce the suspension as media censorship and infringement on their rights to
freedom of speech (see http://www.news24.com/Technology/News/Insurgents-Twitter-
account-suspended-20130125). This message is both explicitly and implicitly conveyed
in the samples above.
In the Boko Haram data, again only four instances of hedging were used (e.g. ‘we are
not sure this is …’), which of course is less frequent in comparison with that of Al
Shabaab. This is expected because, as highlighted above, tweets and statements by rebel
groups seem to hardly consider the point of view of reader. In the samples below, the verb
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phrase ‘thinking of’ is used to indicate undecidedness rather than opinion. The use of
hedges like ‘we think’ indicates that a statement is not based on empirical findings, rather
on the author’s evaluative judgement. But in the Boko Haram’s case, they had simply not
made up their mind to carry out the activities expressed in the tweets.
BOK10. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
We are thinking of banning jeans, Tshirt and Tmlewin shirts … jelabia is more suitable to the
Maiduguri sun and for banks #1STEPAHEAD.
BOK11. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Boko Haramm thinking of replacing cigarettes with sheesha … healthier and with more
vitamins #PROGRESS.
In their effort to Islamize the north and carry out their intended sociocultural revolution,
Boko Haram intends to ban Western lifestyle. Western lifestyle includes fashion and the
use of clothing items associated with the West such as jeans and T-shirts and replace them
with local wears (e.g. ‘jelabia’ – a locally made long gown). They also intend to ban
smoking and replace it with a local stuff (e.g. ‘sheesha’; see Chiluwa and Adegoke 2013).
Since this way of ‘thinking’ will eventually amount to a mandatory infringement on
peoples’ rights to socialization and choice of a lifestyle, it becomes more like threats. It is
therefore right to conclude that hedges defined in terms of holding backing commitment
to a proposition (as they appear in academic discourse) do not really exist in radicalist
discourse.
9.3. Boosters
Boosters, such as certainly, clearly, obviously, surely, etc., enable writers to present their
work with assurance while achieving interpersonal solidarity (Hyland 2005). In the Al
Shabaab tweets below, the writers attempt to sound convincing by introducing some
forms of boosters such as ‘a clear’, to argue against the illegality of the closure of their
Twitter account, which they (Al Shabaab) attribute to Twitter’s fear of the effectiveness of
their (Al Shabaab’s) message often viewed by the public as coming from the ‘other side’
(i.e. terrorists). They also use ‘everything practically possible’ to appeal to the
understanding of the reader in their explanation that women and children were not
targeted in the Westgate attack.
SHAB15. HSMPRESS @HSMPRESS1
…the closure of the account is a clear indication of the effectiveness of the message
emanating from the ‘other side.
SHAB4. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
Mujahideen have no desire to kill women & children and have done everything practically
possible to evacuate them before attacking.
While it is possible that the authors of the above tweets may have anticipated the readers’
solidarity with the ‘clarity’ of the propositions, it is also doubtful that readers (i.e. non-
supporters of Al Shabaab) agree that the Al Shabaab’s Twitter account was ethically
effective. Al Shabaab’s argument in SHAB4 is also hardly convincing since reports
confirmed that both women and children were injured in the Westgate attack, some even
lost their lives. So they could not have ‘done everything practically possible’ to evacuate
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them before the attack (See www.theguardian.com/world/2013/gunmen-kenyan-shopping-
centre-nairobi).
In the same vein, the Boko Haram attempt to appeal to the readers’ solidarity when they
argue for the rightness of their actions. They are aware that some sections of southern
(Nigerian) youths are indeed in support of their bombing attacks in Nigeria and have asked that
the Boko Haram should rather bomb Abuja (the seat of power) and dismiss the current
government (see Chiluwa and Adegoke 2013). Nigerians that anticipate a revolution like those
of Tunisia and Libya have also tweeted their views and shared them in online forums
(e.g. Balya, jokolo. @HeyItsBalya @BOKO_HARAMM I love you guys!! God bless you.
Retweeted by BOKOHARAM). In BOK20 below the writer applies some boosters ‘sure’, and
‘surely’, first to argue the legitimacy of the activities of BokoHaram, and it appears he takes the
support of the reader for granted, when he say ‘I’m sure you know …’; the Nigerian
Government is referred to as ‘the infidel in ‘Aso Rock’ (Aso Rock is Nigeria’s seat of power
equivalent to the US’White House). The writer of tweet inBOK21 also uses ‘surely’ to express
his conviction of the certainty of the success of the Boko Haram insurgency.
BOK20. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
I’m sure you know we were right all along. We suspected this. The infidel in Aso rock has no
clue. #joinboko.
BOK21. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
We are happy to announce the closure of 3 universities: UNIMAID, UI, UNIBEN. Slowly
but surely we shall overcome #UPBOKO.
In BOK21, Boko Haram announce the closure of some Nigerian universities (i.e. University
of Maiduguri, University of Ibadan and University of Benin); but this appears much like a
propaganda since it was never confirmed that these Universities were at anytime shut down
by Boko Haram. I am aware that Nigerian universities were shut down for about four
months in 2013 due to disputes between the Academic Staff Union of Universities and the
Nigerian federal government due to disputes associated with university funding. There were
no cases of university closure in 2011 or 2012 arising from Boko Haram’s attacks. The
emphatic ‘surely’ in the above tweet, which also indicates a firm commitment and
assurance of the writer in the closure of Nigerian universities, does not of course, represent
the view of most Nigerians who strongly believe in the importance of Western education.
In radicalist discourse, writers simply make assertive statements and claims, and in
most cases are confident of the certainty of these claims. This is the reason why boosters
occur more often in the data than hedges (see Table 1). Some of the assertions and claims
appear as accusations levelled against some institutions and governments. The examples
below represent some common boosters in radicalist discourse:
BOK22. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
The truth is it's the army killing innocent people … #askodipeople #askgoodluck. The army
is a mad dog. We are for you.
BOK23. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Fact: federal govt of Nigeria has killed more people thru incompetence this year than Boko
Haram, armed robbers, kidnapaz and MEND.#GASKIYA
Some of the claimed ‘truth’ and ‘fact’ in the above tweets are followed by verbs ‘killing’
and ‘killed’ that indicate actions of the accused agents. In other words, the Nigerian
Government and security agents are accused of killing innocent citizens and this is
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referred to as ‘truth’. Again, the readers’ position is hardly taken into account. In this case
the reader is viewed as a student who should unquestionably accept the (supposed)
factual information provided by his tutor. The Boko Haram here attempts to influence the
view of the Nigerian public and possibly win their sympathy. Some forms of emotional
appeal using stance markers to the reading public are strategic in the process of
radicalization of young people, who might be reading the tweets.
9.4. Attitude markers
Attitude markers express the writer’s affect or emotions. They are usually expressed by
nouns (e.g. infidel, terrorist, coward, fool, etc.), adjectives (e.g. good, happy, foolish,
ludicrous, etc.), verbs (e.g. love, win, plead, massacre, etc.) and adverbs (e.g. unfortunately,
absolutely, practically. etc; see Biber et al. 1999; Gales 2010). In the radicalist discourse
under study, attitude markers generally express triumph, satisfaction, pride, hate and anger,
involving the use of labels and name-calling for governments and institutions. These
attitude markers represent several negative evaluations of the ‘other’, which occurs
frequently in the two sets of data for the study. The Government of Nigeria and security
agents are constantly referred to as ‘infidels’ or ‘terrorists’ by the Boko Haram, while
the Somali Government and security agents are called ‘apostates’. Adjectives, such as
ludicrous, bad, lazy, flagrant, ragtag, etc., exhibiting anger and hate are also used to
describe the governments and their actions. Below are a few examples:
SHAB20. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
It is absolutely ludicrous how the Kenyans seem to disregard their military’s flagrant
massacre of Muslims in Somalia and cry about #Westgate.
SHAB21. HSMPRESS @HSMPRESS1
HSM forces overran apostate checkpoints in the city during initial phase of the multipronged
assault, killing dozens of inebriated apostates.
BOK30. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Even Boko Haramm would not sit by and allow a gang rape. The infidel government of
Nigeria has done enuf #absu #evil5.
BOK31. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
We didn't kill Aikhomu. Bad healthcare unleashed by Terrorist infidel Government did.
The above samples exemplify some forms of lexical and grammatical stance markers in
the data. These consist of accusations and other forms of linguistic violence against the
governments of Nigeria and Somalia. The writers probably believe that strong or
offensive language actually does some harm such as discrediting the accused before the
public or inciting a mass action against them. The expression of hate in the expression
Table 1. Stance features in the activist discourse data.
Stance
Boko Haram = 3060
words Total (%)
Al Shabaab = 800
words Total (%)
Self-mention 131 4.28 04 0.50
Attitude markers 59 1.93 13 1.63
Boosters 06 0.20 04 0.50
Hedges 04 0.13 04 0.50
Threats 03 0.10 02 0.25
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‘absolutely ludicrous’ and the claim ‘flagrant massacre’ in SHAB20 are subtle stance
markers that appeal to emotions of the reader. For instance, a report that Muslims are
flagrantly massacre in Somalia by the Kenyan military has the tendency to incite some
forms of mob action or protest against the government and possibly radicalize those who
are already sympathetic of Al Shabaab’s activities. In BOK31, Boko Haram blames the
death of Augustus Aikhomu (a former Vice President of Nigeria, during Babangida’s
Government) on the federal government’s health care policy. (Aikhomu died in Lagos on
17 August 2011 after a long illness.) The meaning and tone of the verb ‘unleashed’ in the
tweet is sequel to the character of the ‘terrorist’ that is used to describe the Nigerian
Government. Again, this type of claim by Boko Haram is a subtle way of appealing to
public sympathy and to win support. A direct reference to the poor health care policy of
the government, which is a sensitive issue, is the writer’s persuasive attempt to persuade
the reader as well as win public approval and support.
9.5. Self mention
Self-mention is the use of personal pronoun ‘I’ or ‘we’ (and ‘us’), and the possessive
adjective ‘our’ to indicate proposition, affect and interpersonal information (Hyland 2001,
2005). The presence or absence of a definite reference indicates the type of authorial
identity the writer wishes to adopt in his/her work. In radicalist discourse, the
identification of ‘we’ in-group and the ideological positive self-evaluation that follows
is almost highly mandatory. In the two data for this study, the discourse of the tweets
reflects the positive representation of ‘we’ in-group, which aligns with van Dijk’s
ideological square, namely: (1) emphasize our good properties/actions; (2) emphasize
their bad properties/actions; (3) mitigate our bad properties/actions; (4) mitigate their
good properties/actions (van Dijk 1998, 33). In the Nigerian context, Boko Haram
represent ‘We’ and ‘Us’, while the Nigerian Government and security agents represent
‘They’ and ‘Them’. In the Somali context, the TFG of Somalia are ‘They’ and ‘Them’,
while Al Shabaab represent ‘We’ and ‘Us’. Both radical groups claim to fight for the
people (e.g. Muslims) against their national governments. In the data, instances of ‘We’,
‘Us’ and ‘Our’ with their attributing positive qualities are frequent. A few examples from
the data below illustrate the positive actions of the ‘us’ and the negative actions of ‘them’.
BOK40. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Jonathan, Abati, Omokri are a threat to Nigeria not Boko Haramm. We fight for your
liberation even though you are not grateful #LONGTERM.
BOK41. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Nigeria is a joke. Polis, army & govt are jokers. They kill more innocent pple evryday than
Boko has done in a year.
BOK42. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM another's
We have left Nigeria. We are in Boko Republic of Arewa. The infidel nig. govt and kafiri
army should leave us.
BOK43. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
@admutebo. thanks for recognising our good work. One man's terrorist is freedom fighter.
No retreat no surrender.
SHAB22. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
Your eccentric battle strategy has got animal rights groups quite concerned, Major.
SHAB23. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
Your inexperienced boys flee from confrontation & flinck in the face of death.
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In BOK40 above negative actions are attributed to ‘Jonathan’ (i.e. President Goodluck
Jonathan), ‘Abati’ (i.e. Reuben Abati, Special Adviser to President Jonathan on Media and
Policy) and ‘Omokri’ (i.e. Reno Omokri, Special Assistant to President Jonathan on New
Media); they are also described as ‘threats’. On the other hand ‘we’ (Boko Haram) is said to
fight for the liberation of the Nigerian people. The Nigerian Government and security forces
(i.e. ‘they’) are also accused of killing innocent people (BOK42). Positive evaluation of the
in-group generally involves the conscious enunciation of positive property or ‘our good
work’, sometimes with some claimed proofs (e.g. BOK45; BOK46 below) or with a
comparison between ‘us’ and other militant groups (BOK47). In BOK47, Boko Haram
claims to be after ‘ideals’, while MEND (another ethnic militia group) is said to be ‘after
money’ (see Chiluwa and Ajiboye 2014). In other words, ‘they’ are bad but ‘we’ are good.
Hence, they (Boko Haram) appeal to Nigerians to join in their fight (e.g. BOK48).
In the Al Shabaab tweets above, the tweeter is answering back to the Somali military
commander; the latter representing the Somali Government. He represents the ‘They’
whose battle is referred to as ‘your battle’ and soldiers as ‘your boys’. Here, the ‘Other’
naturally attracts negative evaluation of the Al Shabaab tweeter.
BOK45. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Wives and children now see their husbands in the night in Abuja and Maiduguri. Countless
marriages have been saved #COLLATERALEFFECT.
BOK46. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Rate of alcoholism has reduced in Abuja and Maiduguri because of our good work
#COLLATERALEFFECT.
BOK47. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
MEND is after money, we are after ideals. Ideas that come at the right time flourishes.
MEND VS. BOKO HARAM PT.2 #DEADIDEALS
BOK48. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
I wonder how many years of bombing the infidel in aso rock can survive. We plead with
Nigerians to join us in our fight.
Self-mention in radicalist discourse also usually involves the negotiation of group identity
often perceived as endangered by dominant government and institutional forces.
Arguably, Al Shabaab’s activities are rooted in both political and cultural struggle that
is hoped to redefine a new identity for Muslims in Somalia. Unfortunately, they have
consistently applied unethical methods in the pursuit of this objective. In BOK42 above,
the Boko Haram explicitly states that they are no longer Nigerians; thus implying that
although still identified in a physical geopolitical space with Nigeria, they are
psychological and spiritually out of Nigeria and ask to be left alone. Self-mention in
radicalist discourse therefore goes beyond the authorial reference that merely identifies a
writer and his personal role in a research work or his academic authority and
achievement. Since radicalist (protest) writing is not to be viewed as an academic
endeavour, its style, focus and audience also defer. Hence, self-mention in radicalist
discourse projects groups identities, actions and goals that revolve round a group who
construct themselves in terms of their rights to sociopolitical and cultural privileges.
9.6. Threats
According to Fraser (1998, cited in Gales 2010, 6), threats are intentional acts that use
language to send a (special type of) message (addition mine). They are just like any other
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type of speech act that depends on the illocutionary force or the intent of the message
with which they are uttered (Gales 2010). However, threats are different in terms of force,
from the act of promise or invitation, for example, because they are usually made to
express anger, or instil fear. In radicalist discourse, they are mainly used to express hate,
give warning and challenge authority; they are also used to show intent of purpose, and to
attract media attention. In the data, the Boko Haram and Al Shabaab issue several threats
to the Nigerian and Kenyan armies in order to warn them against impending attacks. For
instance SHAB24 below is a response to the Kenyan Government’s failure to heed a threat
before the Westgate attack.
SHAB24. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
The Kenyan government however, turned a deaf ear to our repeated warnings and continued
to massacre innocent Muslims in Somalia #Westgate.
While the attack was still going on at Westgate shopping mall, the Al Shabaab were still
issuing threats, with photos of attackers parading the mall. SHAB25 below is an example.
This type of threat is generally issued in order to instil fear and probably disorganize the
Kenyan armed forces. The ‘big surprise’ in SHAB25 below probably refers to the high
number of casualties and the battle that lasted for two whole days.
SHAB25. MSM Press Office @HSM_PR
The Kenyan govt and FM haven’t the faintest idea of what’s going on inside #Westgate mail.
Rest assured. Kenyans are in for a big surprise!
In the Boko Haram data, threats also occur. While some of them appear like mere
information, they actually function as threats in disguise as in BOK50 and BOK51 below.
BOK50. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Full list of legitimate targets should be out soon. To be advertised in the national dailies
#NOWAYOUT.
BOK51. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
Boom, boom, boom, Boko Haram bomb, do you have any target, yessah yessah, 1 are the
infidels in Maidug, 2 the ones in Abuja #BOKOWORKOUTRHYMES.
BOK52. BOKO HARAM @BOKO_HARAMM
We wonder if the polis in Nigeria is still at his job, take a cue from the met polis and resign.
We’ll mess you up again #INCOMPETENCE.
In the Boko Haram threats in BOK50–52, the words ‘target’ occurs twice (50 and 51),
each of them announcing an intended attack. BOK51 tweet goes further to apply some
form of rhetoric (play on words) to express their intention (this also sounds like a
mockery of the Nigerian military). The threat in BOK52, ‘we’ll mess you up again’,
directed to the Nigerian Police, suggests that they had mess the Police before. As a matter
of fact, Boko Haram is indeed not only messing up the Nigeria security system, but also
the Nigerian Government in the various successes they have recorded in the last three
years.
Threats occur as a significant feature of radicalist discourse and from the reports and
experiences of terrorized places, threat from terrorists and radicalist movements should
not be taken lightly by governments and security agencies. If the Kenyan Government
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had taken some oversight actions to protect the Westgate mall, even after Al Shabaab had
warned them, the impact might not have been that devastating.
Table 1 shows the occurrence of stance markers in the data; it highlights the
prevalence of certain stance markers above the others and to further shade some light on
the feature of radicalist discourse. For instance, as already mentioned in the discussion
above, certain stance markers (e.g. self-mention and attitude markers) are bound to occur
frequently in the discourse of radical movements giving the ideological nature of their
arguments, attitudes and points of view. In most cases, their arguments almost lack
modesty; in other words, they hardly withhold commitment and leave certain claims as an
opinion with the use of hedges and show some respect to the reader’s viewpoint; rather,
they present their arguments as facts and show a great deal of emotional commitment to
them. Emotional words are used to appeal to the emotions of the reader, which is a
strategy to attempt to attract sympathy or even radicalize the reader. Although boosters
reflecting certainty of propositions occur far less than self-mention in the data, they are
still more than hedges.
Wordsmith is used to calculate the frequencies of the stance markers. (Wordsmith is
computer software often used by corpus linguists for a quantitative method of linguistic
analysis. Wordsmith is capable of counting and analysing features of language use being
studied. For instance, Wordsmith can calculate how frequent certain lexical items occur in
a text giving an insight to the language forms or choices made by speakers or writers in a
text. Frequencies can be given as a raw figure or in percentage.) The Boko Haram data
comprise 3060 words and Al Shabaab 800 (as shown on the Table 1), and are converted
to a computer-readable format (i.e. plain text) and analysed using Wordsmith (2010).
Since the data are very small, the frequency of words being sought in the data was simply
counted manually from the concordance. (A concordance is a list of all the occurrences
of a particular word or search term in a corpus and the context in which they occur.)
Figure 1, for example, is a concordance of ‘Infidel’ (attitude marker) from the data.
Stance features in each of the data were obtained and counted manually. The total
sum of the occurrences of words reflecting self-mention (e.g. we, us, our, etc.) in the
N Concordance Set Tag Word # t. # os. a. # os. d. # os. t. # os. File %
1  SEE THE INNOCENT PEOPLE THE INFIDEL GOVERNMENT IS KILLING 1,470 190 6% 0 1% 0 1% earch corpus.txt 34%
2  out…Aso rock is bombing down infidel politicians build it up with looted 1,567 203 7% 0 3% 0 3% earch corpus.txt 36%
3 TAN IS NT UR FRIEND INFIDEL! BOKO HARAM 1,350 177 0% 0 9% 0 9% earch corpus.txt 31%
4  2 Aug 11 @melifew213 INFIDEL YOU ARE ALREADY OUR 1,193 159 5% 0 5% 0 5% earch corpus.txt 27%
5  2 Aug 11 Imagine this infidel saying MEND has a legitimate 1,238 163 4% 0 6% 0 6% earch corpus.txt 28%
6  ALONG. WE SUSPECTED THIS. THE INFIDEL IN ASO ROCK HAS NO CLUE. 1,703 214 3% 0 6% 0 6% earch corpus.txt 39%
7  @DRDAMAGES. WE ASSUME HE IS INFIDEL AND HIS WORDS DONT 2,698 319 5% 0 7% 0 7% earch corpus.txt 62%
8  of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished. 4) We 4,361 414 0% 0 2% 0 2% earch corpus.txt 93%
9  wonder how many years of bombing the infidel in aso rock can survive. We plead 2,498 289 7% 0 3% 0 3% earch corpus.txt 57%
10  we conciliate &adjudicate wt decadent infidel pestiferous rulers of nig, we then r 1,781 221 8% 0 8% 0 8% earch corpus.txt 40%
11  26 Jul 11 REASON THE INFIDEL RULERS LIKE NIGERIA: IT IS 1,875 225 5% 0 0% 0 0% earch corpus.txt 43%
12  We are in Boko Republic of Arewa. The infidel nig. govt and kafiri army should 1,156 156 3% 0 4% 0 4% earch corpus.txt 26%
13  ?@BOKO_HARAMM If we tell the infidel govt to vote for Palestine and they 473 69 9% 0 0% 0 0% earch corpus.txt 11%
14  not sit by and allow a gang rape. The infidel government of Nigeria has done 556 81 3% 0 2% 0 2% earch corpus.txt 13%
15  day of bombs...hope this is not an infidel song. BOKO HARAM 378 51 5% 0 8% 0 8% earch corpus.txt 9%
16  A drop of water we are firing Arewa and infidel Nigeria. Yaro dan is ce ne BOKO 284 43 2% 0 6% 0 6% earch corpus.txt 7%
17  bitch, Jesus in one sentence, you are infidel #ASSWIPE BOKO HARAM 312 45 8% 0 7% 0 7% earch corpus.txt 7%
18  ?@BOKO_HARAMM 17 Sep 11 INFIDEL OBJ DISTURBING THE PEACE 782 109 5% 0 7% 0 7% earch corpus.txt 18%
19  Bad healthcare unleashed by Terrorist infidel Government did. BOKO HARAM 1,089 146 8% 0 3% 0 3% earch corpus.txt 25%
20  we have been causing havoc and bad. Infidel federal government still clueless 1,108 149 5% 0 3% 0 3% earch corpus.txt 25%
21  Obasanjo and Babangida (plus one infidel dunce in aso rock) taking 150 1,005 136 5% 0 1% 0 1% earch corpus.txt 23%
22  ?@BOKO_HARAMM Wonder how that infidel sleeps at night. Oh we know. 902 124 3% 0 9% 0 9% earch corpus.txt 21%
23  ?@BOKO_HARAMM Heard the infidel goyyim at Aso rock got himself 920 128 7% 0 9% 0 9% earch corpus.txt 21%
Figure 1. Concordance of ‘Inﬁdel’ from the Boko Haram data.
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Boko Haram data is 131 as shown above (only 04 instances are shown in the Al Shabaab
data due to the size of data). The same goes for attitude markers. From Table 1, it is quite
clear that words reflecting ideological positive self-evaluation and words reflecting
attitude markers (or emotional commitment) are the most prevalent in radicalist discourse.
This shows that discourses of radical groups or terrorist are highly ideological as this
study shows. Hence, the study of stance in discourse is one fruitful method of studying
the nature of language features as well as their functions in a wider social context.
10. Conclusion
The present study highlights the various subtle ways stance functions in online discourse
of radical groups, showing how authors reflect their positions, commitments and attitudes
in the social media. This attempt is therefore likely to open up reactions and possible
further research endeavours in discourses produced by activist/terrorist groups. The study
also shows that the roles and functions of Twitter in providing a platform for individuals
and groups to express themselves, their viewpoints and attitudes on issues affecting them
is very important. This research also shows that attitude markers and self-mention the
most prevalent features of stance in activist discourse and in most cases are used to
express ideological propositions.
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